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Abstract 
PRESCHOOLERS THINK STRANGERS WILL SHARE THE SAME KNOWLEDGE AS 
OTHER GROUP MEMBERS, BUT WILL NOT BEHAVE LIKE THEM 
 
Megan Norris 
B.S., North Greenville University 
M.A., Appalachian State University 
 
 
Chairperson: Dr. Robyn Kondrad 
 
 
Children learn much of what they know from others’ testimony. But, they are 
selective: children as young as 3 years consider cues to credibility like past accuracy, 
benevolence, and group membership to decide whom to trust. Research on credulity has 
centered on how children’s judgments about a single individual influences their trust for that 
same person later. For instance, if children know that a particular informant has labeled 
objects incorrectly in the past, they are unlikely to later endorse that informant’s testimony. 
The current study explores whether children generalize an epistemic behavior (i.e., being 
knowledgeable) and a social behavior (i.e., being nice) to members who are part of the same 
group but with whom children have had no direct experience. Four- and 5-year-olds learned 
that people who belong to one group (e.g., “red group”) always either provide accurate 
information or are nice, and the other group always demonstrates the opposite behavior. Half 
the children heard the group being labeled and the other half did not. Next, children were 
introduced to two strangers; one wore a red shirt and the other wore a blue shirt. These 
strangers offered the same conflicting behaviors as their group earlier demonstrated. 
  
 
 v 
Children’s generalizations were conditional: they only generalized the epistemic trait when 
the stranger’s group was explicitly labeled. They never generalized the social trait to 
strangers. These data suggest that children use group membership to make inferences about 
strangers’ epistemic and social characteristics in different ways.  
Keywords: selective trust, stereotypes, social categorization 
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Abstract 
Children learn much of what they know from others’ testimony. But, they are selective: 
children as young as 3 years consider cues to credibility like past accuracy, benevolence, and 
group membership to decide whom to trust. Research on credulity has centered on how 
children’s judgments about a single individual influences their trust for that same person 
later. For instance, if children know that a particular informant has labeled objects incorrectly 
in the past, they are unlikely to later endorse that informant’s testimony. The current study 
explores whether children generalize an epistemic behavior (i.e., being knowledgeable) and a 
social behavior (i.e., being nice) to members who are part of the same group but with whom 
children have had no direct experience. Four- and 5-year-olds learned that people who belong 
to one group (e.g., “red group”) always either provide accurate information or are nice, and 
the other group always demonstrates the opposite behavior. Half the children heard the group 
being labeled and the other half did not. Next, children were introduced to two strangers; one 
wore a red shirt and the other wore a blue shirt. These strangers offered the same conflicting 
behaviors as their group earlier demonstrated. Children’s generalizations were conditional: 
they only generalized the epistemic trait when the stranger’s group was explicitly labeled. 
They never generalized the social trait to strangers. These data suggest that children use 
group membership to make inferences about strangers’ epistemic and social characteristics in 
different ways.  
Keywords: selective trust, stereotypes, social categorization 
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Preschoolers Think Strangers will Share the Same Knowledge as Other Group Members, but 
will Not Behave Like Them 
 The extent to which children come to endorse and use stereotypes to guide their own 
beliefs and behavior has become a hot topic in developmental psychology, especially given 
the political climate surrounding gender, racial, and ethnic prejudice. For instance, a recent 
study found that by six years of age girls already endorsed the stereotype that males are 
smarter than females. Further, this belief led girls to be attracted to activities for “kids who 
try hard” and to avoid activities for “really, really smart kids” (Bian, Leslie, & Cimpian, 
2017). Importantly, the researchers argue that ascribing to these beliefs dramatically alters 
girls’ experiences and contributes to gender normative career aspirations.  
 What is exciting about this relatively new wave of research is that scholars are 
moving beyond the question of whether children’s social attitudes give rise to early 
stereotypes that affect members of the stereotyped groups (they do; Aboud, 1988; Bar-Tal, 
1996; Bigler & Liben, 2007; Katz, 1976), and moving towards questions such as how these 
early social categories and associated beliefs influence children’s own behavior and learning 
experiences. The current study contributes to the field by exploring three questions: Will 
preschoolers generate a stereotype of a group and use it to make predictions about the 
groups’ likely future behavior? Will those group stereotypes influence children’s selective 
preferences for strangers who are purportedly a part of that group, but with whom children 
have no direct experience? Will providing a label for the group (i.e., the red and blue people) 
and for the stranger (i.e., the red and blue persons) influence children’s generalization of 
group traits to strangers?   
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 The following sections will provide more background on children’s social 
categorization and stereotyping behaviors as well as how the selective trust paradigm can be 
used to explore how children’s generalizations about individuals might influence their own 
learning behavior.  
Social Categorization and Stereotyping 
Stereotypes are defined as a set of beliefs about the characteristics of members of a 
social category (Hilton & Von Hippel, 1996; McGarty, Yzerbyt, & Spears, 2002). One theory 
about how stereotypes are formed is that they are based initially on a categorization process 
(Allport, 1958; Tajfel, 1969). That is, people form an abstract representation of how 
individuals are alike in some important aspect (e.g., race, gender, animate vs. inanimate) and 
can thus be grouped together and treated as similar (e.g., Medin & Smith, 1981). Stereotypes 
are formed about the social category as people learn more about the associated characteristics 
(e.g., being told or having first-hand experiences that males, a social category, are 
characteristically intelligent). The associated characteristics are then applied generally to all 
members perceived as being part of the social category. This last part of the categorization 
process is called category induction: generalizing category characteristics to novel 
exemplars.  
There are a number of theories about how particular characteristics become 
associated with a social category. For instance, the social learning approach suggests that 
people learn about stereotypes from their interactions with parents, friends, family, media, or 
other social outlets (e.g., Bigler, Jones, & Lobliner, 1997; Bigler & Liben, 2007; Eagly & 
Steffen, 1984; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). As an example, first and second grade girls’ math 
performance suffers when they have a female teacher who says that boys are better at math 
 STRANGERS SHARE KNOWLEDGE WITH GROUPS  5 
 
 
(Beilock, Gunderson, Ramirez, & Levine, 2010). The cognitive developmental approach, 
pioneered by Piaget (1970) suggests that cognitive abilities focus attention on particular 
characteristics by which stereotypes are then formed. For example, young children may focus 
predominantly on perceptually salient characteristics (e.g., gender) whereas older children 
may also consider non-obvious properties (e.g., political affiliation) because they are better 
able to mentally represent both simultaneously. A full review of the many different 
approaches to stereotype formation is beyond the scope of this project (but see Hilton & Von 
Hippel, 1996; Meiser & Hewstone, 2004 for a review).  
It is important to emphasize that categorization is a necessary and natural process that 
begins early in infancy (Kinzler & Spelke, 2011; Langlois et al. 1987; Mahajan & Wynn, 
2012). Categorizing the people, events, objects, and so forth in the environment allows one to 
readily understand relationships between category members and make effortless inductive 
inferences about novel category members (Coley, Medin, & Atran, 1997; Gelman & Coley, 
1990; Heyman & Gelman, 2000; Mareschal & Quinn, 2001). For instance, one reason why 
young infants are such phenomenal word learners is that they use perceptually obvious 
characteristics of an object, like the shape of their family dog, to categorize novel objects and 
generalize labels – seeing the neighbor’s dog for the first time and inducing by its shape that 
it also is a ‘dog’ with other dog-like characteristics (e.g., Baldwin, 1992; Imai, Gentner & 
Uchida, 1994). In other words, infants can learn the names for things at an astonishing rate 
because they can categorize like objects and make assumptions about what they are called, 
rather than having to learn the word for each object as a 1:1 ratio. Forming social categories, 
and subsequently forming stereotypes about those social categories is equally as necessary 
and important for learning about our social world as forming any other kind of category. 
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Without social categories, it would be difficult to explain and predict human behavior and 
one would be limited in his or her ability to navigate the social world.   
Social essentialism is the predominant theory in developmental psychology that 
explains how young children form social categories in the first place. The essentialist 
approach suggests that there are inherent and often non-obvious qualities to living things and 
objects that make up the essence of categories that go beyond physical appearance (Gelman, 
2003; Hirschfeld, 1996; Medin & Ortony, 1989). For example, Gelman and Coley (1990) 
asked 2.5 year-olds to look at typical and atypical category exemplars (e.g., a bluebird vs. a 
dodo bird) and decide whether certain qualities were true about each (e.g., does it live in a 
nest?). If children relied only on perceptual features, they should not expect a perceptually 
atypical category exemplar like a dodo to live in a nest, but they do. Further, by age five 
years, children treat natural categories (i.e., person, dog, female) as distinct from artifact 
categories (i.e., chair, book, tool; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009). Boundaries for artifact 
categories are seen as more flexible and subjective, whereas natural categories are seen as 
more objectively correct (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009). 
There are two theories that describe how children form social categories that fit under 
the social essentialist approach. One of these theories has a focus on natural kinds and the 
other has a focus on social obligations. The theory that social categories are natural kinds 
proposes that the social world is composed of discrete kinds determined by nature which are 
stable, such as gender (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992; Rhodes, 2013). In a study conducted by 
Haslam, Rothschild, and Ernst (2000), adults rated social categories on different elements of 
essentialism. Researchers found that one of the dimensions that capture the structure of 
essentialist thinking follows closely with the theory of natural kinds. This dimension includes 
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perceptions of naturalness (natural vs. artificial), immutability (unchangeable), and historical 
stability (stable over time) suggesting that natural categories, such as race or gender, are 
unalterable, unlike categories like political affiliation or social class.  
The theory that social categories are markers of social obligations suggests that social 
categories highlight relationships between people. This includes expectations that members 
of a category have inherent obligations to each other, therefore allowing for predictions of 
patterns of social interactions (Rhodes, 2013). For example, it is proposed that expectations 
are in place for a member of a category to befriend members of the same category and refrain 
from harming members of the same category. In a study conducted by Rhodes (2012), 
children 3- through 5-years old used novel social categories, even when they were arbitrarily 
defined, when making inferences about other children’s behaviors. The participants were 
introduced to a group named the Flurps and another group named the Zazes. The researcher 
asked the child to predict the recipient of an action performed by an agent, “who did the 
Flurp steal a cookie from, another Flurp or a Zaz?”  The children predicted that the Flurp 
stole a cookie from the Zaz, suggesting that 3 to 5 year olds believe agents would not harm 
their own group members (Rhodes, 2012). Children also expected agents from one category 
to harm members of another category (Rhodes, 2012).  
Finally, a theoretical model developed by Bigler and Liben (2006; 2007) called the 
Developmental Intergroup Theory focuses on which specific characteristics of people 
become the basis of social categories rather than other characteristics.  For instance, social 
categorizations are formed based on gender rather than height. This theory suggests that there 
are three processes that contribute to the formation of social categories and stereotypes: 
establishing the psychological salience of different attributes of the person (e.g. perceptual 
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discriminability), categorizing individuals by salient dimensions (e.g. classification into 
groups), and developing stereotypes and prejudices of salient social groups (e.g. implicit or 
explicit bias). Children first begin to develop stereotypes when people are explicitly labeled, 
treated, or sorted differently from each other. This then leads to the conceptualization of 
different social categories (Bigler & Liben, 2006; Bigler & Liben, 2007). Explicitly 
communicating stereotypic beliefs allows children to internalize those beliefs and then detect 
variations between groups and attributes that would have otherwise been overlooked (Bigler 
& Liben, 2006; Bigler & Liben, 2007). For example, when young girls enter school they may 
be classified into a group based on gender and even labeled often by that category label 
(“Good morning, boys and girls”; Bigler, 1995). This facilitates children’s conceptualization 
of this social category. Girls may then be treated differently from boys in areas of school 
achievement such as math skills which can also be communicated by the teacher either 
implicitly or explicitly (Beilock et al., 2010).  Girls then begin to notice subtle differences 
between genders and internalize these beliefs that they are not as smart as boys (Bian et al., 
2017). Girls internalizing these beliefs can cause them to seek other activities that are not as 
challenging, resulting in a possible long lasting effect on girls’ choices of occupation (Bian et 
al., 2017).  
In summary, the categorization process begins early in life as a strategy for 
processing and quickly learning new information about the world. Of particular interest for 
the current study is the process of social categorization that gives rise to stereotypes in early 
childhood. In the current study, I investigated whether preschoolers use a perceptually salient 
cue (i.e., shirt color) as a marker for group membership, characterize that group with either 
an epistemic (i.e., knowledgeable) or social (i.e., nice) trait, and extend those traits to novel 
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category exemplars (i.e., to people who are either explicitly labeled as or perceptually appear 
to belong to a particular group).  
Labeling 
Labels facilitate children’s categorization processes (Bigler, Jones, & Lobliner, 1997; 
Cimpian & Markman, 2009; Gelman & Coley, 1990). For example, 16-month-old infants are 
more likely to generalize non-obvious properties of novel objects if the category to which it 
belonged was labeled (Keates & Graham, 2008). First, an experimenter introduced a target 
object and displayed its non-obvious property, (i.e. the sound it made), then labeled the 
object by saying, “Look, this is a blick.”  When the experimenter later used the same label for 
a test object, the infants expected the test object to make the same sound as the target object. 
But, if the experimenter did not label the test object, infants expected it to share the same 
property as something else that was a similar shape (Keates & Graham, 2008). Toddlers do 
the same thing: 2.5-year-olds make more accurate category inductions about animals when 
the animals are labeled, especially unusual animals like a Dodo bird (Gelman & Coley, 
1990). For example, toddlers claimed that the dodo lives in a nest when the dodo was labeled 
as a bird, but did not expect it to live in a nest when it was not labeled.  
Preschoolers also use labels to make inductive inferences about unusual category 
exemplars (Jaswal, 2004). Researchers showed 3-and 4-year-olds a picture of an animal that 
looked a lot like a cat, and told them that even though it might be hard to believe, it, “is 
actually a dog”. When asked if the animal would drink milk like a cat or eat bones like a dog, 
the children made inferences about the animal that were consistent with the label (i.e., it will 
eat bones). These results suggest that preschoolers use labels to make inductive inferences 
even when they conflict with perceptual cues (Jaswal, 2004).  
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Labels guide preschoolers’ social category inductions as well. For example, after 
learning about two children, one who was shy and the other who was friendly, a third child 
was introduced who looked like the friendly child but who was labeled as being shy. 
Preschoolers relied on trait labels rather than appearances when deciding which 
psychological quality was true about the third child (Heyman & Gelman, 2000). Using a 
similar paradigm, five-year-olds heard about two characters’ social (i.e., religion) and 
personality (i.e., shyness) categories and what they each liked to play (e.g., a shy, religious 
boy who likes to play zigo vs. a friendly, secular boy who likes to play zaber; Diesendruck & 
HaLevi, 2006). When asked what a third child liked to play, who shared the same social 
category as one boy and the same personality category as the other boy, children relied more 
on matching the social category (e.g., saying the third child would like to play zigo), than 
they did the personality category. Importantly, children relied exclusively on the label; even 
when they had pictures, children’s inductions were consistent with the label and not the 
perceptual cues (Diesendruck & HaLevi, studies 2 and 3).   
Clearly, labels provide an efficient way for children to learn about the people and 
objects in their environment. They can direct more energy into learning new things, because 
they can make assumptions about the properties that novel objects and people might have 
given their labels. When labels are used in a generic way (e.g., boys are smart) rather than in 
a specific way (e.g., this boy is smart), the effect of the label is enhanced (e.g., Cimpian, 
Brandone, & Gelman, 2010; Cimpian & Markman, 2011). For example, in one study 4-year-
olds learned about non-obvious properties of a novel creature. Some heard a plural or 
singular generic phrase (e.g., Zarpies are scared of ladybugs or A Zarpie is scared of 
ladybugs) and others heard a specific phrase (e.g., This Zarpie is scared of ladybugs). Those 
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children who heard generic phrases were more likely than those who heard specific phrases 
to associate innate characteristics with the Zarpies, extend properties of a single Zarpie to all 
Zarpies, and view being a Zarpie as a causal factor for having the non-obvious property 
(Rhodes, Leslie, & Tworek, 2012).  
Generic language also increases stereotyping for perceptually obvious categories, 
such as biological sex (Bigler, 1995). In a field study, elementary school children between 
the ages of 6 and 11 years were assigned to one of three classrooms. In one classroom, the 
teacher used gender to assign children to groups, and highlighted the groups by using 
physical space (e.g., bulletin boards to display girls’ vs. boys’ artwork) and verbal 
instructions (e.g., “How many girls/boys know the answer?”). In a second classroom, color 
was used to assign groups (red vs. green) and the teachers used the same physical and verbal 
means to highlight those groups. In the third classroom, there were no groups. Teachers were 
instructed to treat the classroom as a single unit and to use specific language (e.g., “Does 
Tom/Tina know the answer?”). After 4 weeks, children in the gender classroom expressed 
more gender stereotypes relative to baseline measures when asked to rate certain activities as 
more feminine or masculine than either of the other two conditions. This research suggests 
that the use of generic labels increases stereotyping more than specific language, and as a 
result can influence the learning experiences children may have.  
In summary, children begin to use labels at a very young age to make inferences 
about non-obvious qualities of novel objects (Gelman & Coley, 1990; Keates & Graham, 
2008). Preschoolers use labels to make inductions about people’s behaviors or preferences 
(Diesendruck & HaLevi, 2006; Heyman & Gelman, 2000). Using labels in a generic rather 
than a specific way may activate stereotypical beliefs about category members because it 
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implies normative behaviors or traits (Bigler, 1995; Cimpian et al., 2010, Cimpian & Scott, 
2012, Hammond & Cimpian, 2017, Rhodes et al. 2012). In the current study, I ask whether 
labeling a group (e.g., “These are the red people.”) will increase the likelihood that 
preschoolers will generalize the groups’ epistemic or social traits to strangers.  
Theory of Mind     
Preschoolers’ theory of mind ability may be related to inferences that children make 
about strangers based on strangers’ group membership. Theory of mind is the ability to 
mentalize: to understand others’ desires, beliefs, and intentions, how those mental states 
relate to behavior, and that mental states may differ from person to person (Wellman & Liu, 
2004). Children’s mentalizing ability increases rapidly throughout their preschool years 
(Wellman & Liu, 2004). Some researchers suggest that theory of mind improves because of 
brain and cognitive development (see Mahy, Moses, & Pfeifer, 2014 for a review). As 
children’s brains mature, they have increased information processing, working memory, and 
other executive functioning abilities (Cuevas & Bell, 2014; Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, & 
Lee, 2006). As a result, children are better able to set aside their own beliefs, desires, 
emotions, or knowledge in order to step into someone else’s mind.  
Better theory of mind ability may make it less likely that children will generalize a 
characteristic they have come to know about some category members to novel ones. For 
example, a child may learn that teachers at their school generally like to eat apples. Children 
with better theory of mind abilities may be less likely than children with less developed 
abilities to expect a new teacher to also like apples. One of the skills that develops between 
the ages of 3 and 5 is the understanding that people have diverse desires that influence how 
they behave (Wellman & Liu, 2004). Children with better diverse-desire understanding may 
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realize that group membership may not be relevant for certain kinds of behaviors, like food 
preferences.   
The negative correlation between perspective taking and stereotyping is seen in adults 
(Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). Undergraduate students created a narrative about an elderly 
man in a photograph. Participants were either asked to take the perspective of the man in the 
photograph or were not given any specific instructions. Later, participants in the perspective 
taking group expressed less stereotypic attitudes towards the elderly in their narratives and 
were generally more positive toward the target in the photograph than participants in the 
control condition. In other words, when asked to jump into the shoes of someone else, adults 
treat that person as an individual rather than as a generic older adult. As a result, people are 
less likely to make stereotypical assumptions about the individual when they take their 
perspective (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000).  
A similar pattern emerges with preschool-aged children: those who are better at false 
belief theory of mind tasks are less likely to engage in stereotypical behaviors (Mulvey, 
Rizzo, & Killen, 2016). In the false belief theory of mind task, children have to understand 
that someone else may not have the same access to information as the child had, and may 
therefore have a false belief (Wellman & Liu, 2004). For example, a child may be given 
information about an item that is unexpectedly inside a box (i.e. a button inside a bandage 
box) but another person is not given this information; for a child to display false belief theory 
of mind, they must be able to infer that that other person would think that the expected item – 
bandages – would be inside the box, rather than the unexpected button.  
One study found that 3- to 6-year-olds who passed false belief tasks were more likely 
to challenge gender norms than those who failed (Mulvey et al., 2016). Children were told 
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stories about a member of a group who wanted to play with a gender-atypical toy. Then, 
children answered questions about their expectations of the likelihood of the target of the 
story to resist gender stereotypes such as, “Do you think he will tell the group that he wants 
to play with tea sets? What would you tell the group?”  Those children who passed false 
belief expected peers to challenge group norms relating to gender stereotypes and were more 
likely to propose playing a gender-neutral game than children who failed false belief 
(Mulvey et al., 2016).  
The current study explores whether theory of mind is correlated with children’s 
generalization of group traits to strangers. If children are better at perspective taking they 
may be less likely to generalize to strangers because they think of the stranger as an 
individual with unique beliefs and desires. Children may be willing to extend group traits, but 
only if they have direct experience with the stranger.  
Selective Trust  
Selective trust tasks have been used to explore how preschool-aged children make 
decisions about whether to believe others’ testimony (e.g., Jaswal & Neely, 2006; Koenig & 
Harris, 2005). In the classic paradigm, children hear two speakers offer conflicting testimony 
about familiar objects. One speaker always labels one object correctly and the other always 
labels it incorrectly. Later, children hear the same two speakers offer conflicting novel labels 
for several novel objects and have to decide which of the two speakers to believe. The idea is 
that children will form a representation about the two speakers (i.e., one is always right and 
the other always wrong) and they will later use those representations to guide their learning 
by selectively believing novel information provided by the reliable speaker and ignoring the 
unreliable one (Koenig, Clement, & Harris, 2004).       
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 There is a plethora of research that shows preschoolers are sensitive to many 
epistemic cues that indicate credibility. They selectively prefer learning new information 
from informants who have been accurate in the past (e.g., Jaswal & Neely, 2006; Koenig & 
Harris, 2005), confident (e.g., Tenney, Small, Kondrad, Jaswal, & Spellman, 2011), or who 
are known experts (e.g., Boseovski & Thurman, 2014; VanderBorght & Jaswal, 2009). 
Children also use social cues when deciding whether someone is trustworthy. Using the 
selective trust paradigm, for instance, children generated representations of one informant as 
benevolent and another as mean. Later, children preferred learning novel information from 
the benevolent individual (Johnston, Mills, & Landrum, 2015; Landrum, Pflaum, & Mills, 
2015).  
Group membership is a particularly powerful social cue for trust. For example, 
children endorse information from an individual who earlier had been a member of a 
consensus over one who was a dissenter (Corriveau, Fusaro & Harris, 2009). In fact, even 
when children know that the consensus has provided inaccurate information they will often 
defer (Chen, Corriveau, & Harris, 2012; Corriveau & Harris, 2010). The authors have argued 
that it is advantageous for children to be perceived as likeable by the majority group and so 
children provide “respectful deference” even when they do not truly believe the testimony 
(see also Jaswal & Kondrad, 2016). The power of group membership intensifies when 
children perceive themselves to be part of a particular group. For instance, children saw one 
informant who had a native-accent and another informant who had a non-native accent 
demonstrate the functions of several objects. Later, children were more likely to agree with 
the way the native-accented speaker used the object (Kinzler, Corriveau, & Harris, 2011). 
Similarly, children who were assigned to be part of a group defined by shirt colors later, 
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using the selective trust paradigm, showed preferences for in-group testimony even though 
out-group members were just as knowledgeable (MacDonald, Schug, Chase & Barth, 2013).     
Clearly, children make epistemic generalizations and decisions based on epistemic or 
social cues (i.e., knowledgeable and benevolent people will know more, so I will endorse 
their testimony). But, they also make social generalizations and decisions based on social 
cues (i.e., people nice in the past are going to be nice later, so I will befriend them). For 
example, using a modified selective trust paradigm, preschoolers indicated that they would 
rather be friends with native than non-native accented speakers (Kinzler, Shutts, DeJesus & 
Spelke, 2009; Kinzler, Shutts & Spelke, 2012). When faced with native- and non-native 
accented speakers who were mean, children’s dislike was greater for out-group than in-group 
members (Kinzler & DeJesus, 2013).  
In summary, there is no doubt that children are sensitive to epistemic and social cues 
to credibility and that guide their learning and social preferences. But nearly all of the 
research in this area has focused on how the representation children build about a given 
individual later influences their predictions about that same individual’s future behavior and 
subsequent selective trust. What is less clear is whether children generalize group 
characteristics to individuals who are purportedly a part of that group, but with whom 
children have no direct experience, and if they do, whether that generalization will influence 
their selective epistemic or social preferences towards those unfamiliar individuals. The 
current study is the first to take advantage of this paradigm to investigate how children 
generalize social and epistemic characteristics to novel category members, and whether those 
generalizations lead to preferences when it comes to learning new information. This is the 
first study to use the selective trust paradigm to specifically explore how children might use 
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generated stereotypes to guide their learning about novel objects and novel behaviors from 
strangers. The selective trust paradigm provides a well-validated approach to addressing 
these questions.  
Current Study 
The current study addresses these questions using a modified selective trust paradigm. 
First, 4- and 5-year-olds were introduced to two groups identified by shirt color. In one 
condition, the groups displayed a positive or negative epistemic behavior (knowledgeable or 
not). In another condition, the groups demonstrated a positive or negative social behavior 
(nice or not). Children then heard the groups offer conflicting novel words for novel objects 
in the epistemic condition, or display conflicting novel behaviors on novel objects in the 
social condition, and were then invited to endorse the novel label or novel behavior of their 
choice. I anticipated that children would prefer the group demonstrating the desirable 
characteristic. Next, children were introduced to two strangers wearing either a red or blue 
shirt who had never had contact with the groups.  
The primary question of interest was whether children would generalize their earlier 
stereotypes about the groups (i.e., this is a nice group) to these strangers, even though they 
have never observed information about the strangers epistemic or social characteristics. In 
addition, half of the children heard the group and stranger explicitly labeled by their group 
status (red/blue) whereas the other half heard the groups and strangers referred to generically 
(these people/this person). This secondary question explored whether labels would facilitate 
children’s stereotypes and influence their selective trust more than if category membership 
remained ambiguous. Finally, children completed a series of Theory of Mind tasks in order to 
assess individual differences in perspective taking ability.  Of interest was whether a child’s 
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ability to understand the mindset of a stranger  perceived to be a member of a group would 
lead tosubsequentl refraining from stereotyping the appropriate epistemic and social traits to 
the stranger.  
There are two unique features of the current study that are important to note. First, 
children who participated were not part of either group being introduced to them. In most of 
the previous research on intergroup processes, children have been members of one of the 
groups and the studies addressed how being a part of an in- or out-group influenced 
children’s behavior. In the current study, I am specifically interested in exploring how 
children might use social categories to guide their expectations about groups and strangers 
when they are not members themselves of any of the groups involved.   
This age group was selected because of several developmental shifts that occur 
around the 4-and 5-year-old age range. First, children are better able to keep track of 
credibility cues like a history of accuracy and inaccuracy when they are four years old; 
younger children only track inaccuracy whereas older children track both (Corriveau, Meints, 
& Harris, 2009). Older children may be better at keeping track of multiple cues in part 
because their executive functioning abilities, especially inhibitory control and working 
memory, improve from 3- to 5-years of age (Belsky, 2013; Zelazo, Carlson, & Kezek, 2008). 
As noted above, there are also dramatic changes in theory of mind ability taking place during 
this age range that could have consequences for stereotyping behaviors (Wellman & Liu, 
2004). Finally, this age range represents a time when children may be on the cusp of 
sensitivity to stereotypes impacting their own behaviors. Some research has found that it is 
not until six years of age that children have clear expectations about some types of 
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stereotypes, like gender norms (Bian et al., 2017). Therefore, children younger than six may 
be less sensitive to stereotypes and are not yet using them to to guide their experiences. 
I expected children who are learning about information would have a stronger 
preference for the groups and strangers with the desirable trait than children who are learning 
about behaviors. I expected selective preferences would be stronger for the group members 
than the strangers. I also expected older children and children who heard social category 
labels would display stronger preferences for the stranger. Additionally, I expected greater 
performance on the theory of mind tasks and would negatively influence performance on the 
generalization trials.  
Method 
Participants 
 One-hundred-six children participated in a single 15-minute session. Due to failure to 
pass catch trials and experimenter error, 14 children were excluded from the sample. This 
rate of exclusion is typical for this age range (e.g., Jaswal, Mckercher, & VanderBorght, 
2008; Palmquist, Jaswal, & Rutherford, 2016). The final sample included 92 children with 44 
four-year-olds (Mage = 55.14 months, SD = 3.16; 24 girls) and 48 five-year-olds (Mage = 66.13 
months, SD = 2.97; 24 girls). Children were recruited from a database of families from the 
community and local preschools and came from predominately white, middle class 
backgrounds. Participants were treated according to the guidelines set forth by the American 
Psychological Association, see Appendix B for IRB approval documentation.   
Design  
 Children participated in one of four conditions: Epistemic Labeled (n = 23; ages 50 
months – 71 months; Mage = 60.96 months, SD = 5.99), Social Labeled (n = 24; ages 48 
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months– 70 months; Mage = 61 months, SD = 6.96), Epistemic Not-Labeled (n = 22; ages 51 
months – 69 months; Mage = 60.68 months, SD = 5.30), and Social Not-Labeled (n = 23; ages 
50 months – 72 months; Mage = 60.83 months, SD = 7.14)
1
. Approximately equal numbers of 
4- and 5-year-olds participated in each condition. In each of the four conditions, children 
completed four trial blocks: (a) four familiarization trials, (b) four group preference trials, (c) 
four generalization trials, and (d) two catch trials. Following the catch trials, children were 
asked three exploratory questions, completed a series of theory of mind tasks (see Appendix 
A), and completed a memory check at the conclusion of the study.  
Materials 
Twelve familiar objects were used for the familiarization and catch trials, and 16 
novel objects were used in the group preference and generalization trials for the Epistemic 
condition (see Table 1 for a list of familiar and novel objects). High quality photographs were 
taken of the informants wearing either red or blue shirts as they are pointing to objects for the 
relevant trials in the Epistemic condition. Four photographs of informants demonstrating nice 
or mean behaviors (see Table 2 for list of behaviors adapted from Baltazar, Shutts, & 
Kinzler, 2012) were used for the familiarization trials in the Social condition. Eight more 
photographs (four of the groups and four of the strangers sitting in neutral positions with 
neutral expressions), were used in the group preference and generalization trials, 
respectively, for the Social condition. Directly after the catch trials, children were shown 
photographs of the group members and answered exploratory questions about the groups. In 
the memory check, children were presented with two photographs of the groups, one 
displayed directly above the other. These photographs were cropped so that only the people’s 
                                               
1 Data collection is still in progress. The remaining 4 children are being run but I do not anticipate the data to 
change at this point.  
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faces were visible, and were in black and white. All photographs were shown on a 15 inch 
laptop computer using a PowerPoint slideshow. Children’s sessions were video recorded for 
later response coding.  
Procedure 
 Children were seen individually in a lab or a quiet space in their preschool, sitting 
next to the researcher with the computer screen in front of them. The researcher began by 
first introducing the two groups of informants displayed on the screen. The group members 
were sitting around a table with three people sitting close to one another on one side of the 
table wearing the same color shirts (red) and three other people sitting closely on the other 
side of the table wearing a different color shirt (blue). Half of the children heard the groups 
being labeled by their group name on each trial, and the other half did not hear a particular 
label: “The Red people/these people and the Blue people/these people are going to show you 
some things and tell you what they are called.” The group that was introduced first was 
counterbalanced across participants. The researcher then asked children to decide who they 
thought was saying the right thing in the Epistemic condition, or who they thought was doing 
the nice thing in the Social condition.  
Familiarization trials. On each of the four familiarization trials, the children in the 
Epistemic condition learned which group knew the correct familiar object labels. Children in 
the Social condition learned which group was nice or mean. For each trial, the children in the 
Epistemic condition saw a photograph displaying the informants in one group pointing to one 
of two familiar objects. The researcher explained that, “The Red people /these people say this 
is the shoe, and the Blue people /these people say this is the shoe.” The researcher then 
invited the children to decide, “Who is saying the right thing?”  One group was always 
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correct (pointing to the target object, a shoe, on the table) and the other always incorrect 
(pointing to a different object, a ball, on the table), but whether it was the red or blue group 
and which group was discussed first was counterbalanced across participants.  
The procedure was the same for children in the Social condition, except that the 
informants were demonstrated four different types of nice (or mean) behaviors instead of 
knowledge. For instance, on one trial children learned that the people in the “red” group, 
“share the cookies,” whereas the people in the “blue” group “steal the cookies.” Informants 
were depicted with typical expressions corresponding with nice (smiles) and mean (frowns) 
behaviors and portraying the action that was described. In the case of stealing and sharing 
cookies, nice informants were shown offering cookies to each other and the mean informants 
were shown holding cookies close to themselves and turning away from each other. 
Informants were displayed in this way to illustrate the actions that they were doing and their 
facial expressions act as an additional cue for niceness or meanness. Children then decided 
who was “doing the nice thing.” See Table 2 for a description of the objects, labels, and 
behaviors. 
Group Preference trials. Immediately after the four familiarization trials, the four group 
preference trials began. The point of these trials was to verify that children generated the 
stereotype I expected (knowledgeable or nice) and preferred the group who displayed the 
desirable characteristic. In the Epistemic condition and Social condition, the procedure is 
identical to the familiarization trials. The only exception is that the informants pointed to 
novel objects and novel labels were used in the Epistemic condition and in the Social 
condition, informants were shown sitting at the table with their hands in their laps and neutral 
expressions. In the Social condition, descriptions of novel behaviors using past tense novel 
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verbs were used to describe a previous action that the informants had done (See Tables 1 and 
2 for objects and behaviors).  
Generalization trials. The four generalization trials proceeded in the same manner as 
the group preference trials, except instead of seeing the two groups, the children saw two 
strangers. One of these strange individuals wore a red shirt and the other wore a blue shirt. 
The researcher explained that, “These are new people, and neither of these people have met 
any of the other people we were just looking at.” She then introduced the game in the same 
way as she did for the group preference trials: “the Red person/this person and the Blue 
person/this person are going to show us some things and tell us what they are called.” Who 
was introduced first was counterbalanced across children.  
Catch trials. Given the repetitive nature of the previous trials, children could have 
developed a side bias or may have begun making selections without paying much attention. 
The two catch trials were similar to the previous four trials and were meant to catch these 
issues. For children in the Epistemic condition, the two pictured objects were both familiar 
(See Table 1) and trials proceeded in the same way as the Familiarization trials, except that 
each stranger was correct once. To pass the catch trials, children chose each stranger once. 
Similarly, for children in the Social condition the strangers demonstrated one familiar nice 
and one familiar mean behavior each, such as hitting a plush animal versus hugging a plush 
animal. Children indicated who was doing the right thing and must choose each informant 
once in order to pass the catch trials.  
Exploratory Questions. Directly after the catch trials, the researcher displayed the 
photographs of the two groups, side by side. The researcher asked three questions about the 
group members. First, the researcher asked children to identify which group had the positive 
 STRANGERS SHARE KNOWLEDGE WITH GROUPS  24 
 
 
characteristic, “Look at these people, can you tell me which people knew more/was nicer.”  
The second question was an implicit measure of association relating to shirt color preference: 
“If you had the choice between a red or blue shirt to wear, which color shirt would you want 
to wear?”  The third question was open-ended and asked the child to freely answer, “What 
are the red and blue people like?”    
Theory of Mind Tasks. After the selective trust task, the researcher assessed 
children’s theory of mind using a standard testing procedure developed by Wellman and Liu 
(2004). The tasks were administered in the following order: Diverse Desires, Diverse Beliefs, 
Knowledge Access, Contents False Belief, Explicit False Belief, and Real-Apparent Emotion 
(refer to Appendix A for the script for each task).  
To pass the Diverse Desires task, children had to differentiate between their own and 
someone else’s preferences. To pass the Diverse Beliefs task, children had to differentiate 
between their own belief and someone else’s belief. To pass the Knowledge Access task, 
children had to understand the not-seeing equals not-knowing rule. In the Contents False 
Belief task, children had to set their own knowledge aside in order to recognize that someone 
else likely had an incorrect belief due to prior expectations. In the Explicit False Belief task, 
children had to recognize how someone’s belief, which is different from their own, will lead 
to a particular behavior, which would also be different from their own. Finally, the Real-
Apparent Emotion task requires children to recognize that outwardly displayed emotions can 
be different than simultaneous internal feelings. If a participant failed two tasks in a row then 
the experimenter stopped administering tasks (Wellman & Liu, 2004).   This set of tasks is 
regarded as a reliable and valid measure of preschoolers’ theory of mind ability (Ahmadi, 
Jalaie, & Ashayeri, 2015; Wellman, Fang, Liu, Zhu, & Liu, 2006; Wellman & Liu, 2004). 
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Memory Check. A memory check was presented at the conclusion of the study to 
check whether children were able to identify which group members were knowledgeable or 
nice without shirt color information, showing that they were paying attention to the faces of 
the informants rather than shirt color alone. Photographs of the group members were altered 
to be in black and white and the photos were shown stacked on top of each other to remove 
color or side information. Once prompted to look at the people’s faces, the researcher said, “I 
want you to look at these faces, do you remember who was smarter/nicer?  These people or 
these people?” while pointing to the pictures. In this check, color labels were not used to 
describe the people so that children had to rely solely on the face information rather than shirt 
color or side of the screen for the correct answer. 
Hypotheses 
I expected a main effect of condition: children in the Epistemic condition would have 
a stronger preference for the groups and strangers with the desirable trait than children in the 
Social condition. I expected a main effect of trial type: selective preferences would be 
stronger in the group preference trials than in the generalization trials. I also expected a main 
effect of age and label: older children and children in Labeled conditions would display 
stronger preferences for the stranger. Additionally, I expected a negative correlation between 
performance on the theory of mind tasks and performance on the generalization trials.  
Results 
Preliminary analyses revealed no effects or interactions involving age or gender. 
Subsequent analyses were collapsed across these factors. A main effect was found for 
counterbalancing order (there were 8 orders to which children were semi-randomly assigned) 
in the generalization trials, F(7, 84) = 3.47, p = .003, partial η
2
 = .35. Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that orders 1 (M = 1.50, SD = 1.00) and 5 (M = 1.73, SD = 1.74) had lower scores 
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than orders 2 (M = 3.33, SD = 1.15) and 4 (M = 3.27, SD = 0.79). These results should be 
considered with caution because of the low sample size (n ranged from 10–12). Orders 2 and 
4 depicted the informants with the desirable trait in blue and orders 1 and 5 depicted the 
informants with the desirable trait in red. This same pattern was not seen in the other orders. 
For that reason, and because of the small sample size, order was not considered in subsequent 
analyses.  
As expected, there were significant differences in selective preferences between trial 
blocks (familiarization, group preference, generalization), F(2, 168) = 46.00, p < .001, η
2 
= 
.35. Pairwise comparisons using a Bonferroni test showed a significant difference between 
the familiarization trials (M = 3.85, SD = 0.44) and group preference trials (M = 2.92, SD = 
1.23), p < .001. The familiarization trials also differed from the generalization trials (M = 
2.46, SD = 1.35), p < 001. There was also a significant difference between the group 
preference and generalization trials, p = .019. In other words, selective preferences were 
clearest in the familiarization trials where children knew what the correct object or nice 
behavior was already, and preferences were the least clear in the generalization trials where 
children had to extend characteristics from groups to strangers. The results for each trial 
block are reported below, as well as results for exploratory questions, memory check, and 
theory of mind.  
Familiarization Trials 
 As expected, children in all four conditions could identify who was saying or doing 
“the right/nice thing” when the groups were labeling familiar objects or being nice/mean. As 
Figure 1 shows, children in the Epistemic Labeled and Not-Labeled conditions endorsed the 
labels from the accurate group on average, 3.87 (SD = 0.46) and 3.59 (SD = 0.66) out of four 
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trials, respectively. Children in the Social Labeled and Not-Labeled conditions endorsed the 
nice group’s behaviors as the “nice thing” on average 4.00 (SD = 00) and 3.91 (SD = 0.29) of 
four trials, respectively (see Table 3 for means and standard deviations). All four conditions 
were above what would be expected by chance performance of 2, ts > 11.19, ps < .001, ds > 
2.40.  
A one-way analysis of variance revealed an effect of condition, F(3, 88) = 3.94, p = 
.011, such that children in the Epistemic Not-Labeled condition were less likely to identify 
the accurate group than children in the Social Labeled (p = .008) and Social Not-Labeled (p = 
.059) conditions. Despite the condition differences, tests against chance show that children in 
all four conditions formed a clear representation of one group as demonstrating a desirable 
trait and the other as demonstrating an undesirable trait.  
Group Preference Trials 
Figure 1 shows the average number of times out of four trials children endorsed the 
group that earlier demonstrated the desirable trait as a function of condition. As the figure 
shows, children in the Epistemic Labeled, Social Labeled and Social Not-Labeled conditions 
did so on 2.91 (SD = 1.08), 3.13 (SD = 1.33), and 3.17 (SD = 1.30) of four trials, 
respectively. All were higher than what was expected by chance performance of 2, ts > 4.03, 
ps < .002, ds > 0.83. In contrast, children in the Epistemic Not-Labeled condition did not 
prefer one group over the other. They endorsed novel labels provided by the previously 
accurate group on 2.45 (SD = 1.10) of four trials, which was no different from chance 
performance, t(21) = 1.94, p = .066. A one-way analysis of variance revealed no significant 
differences between the conditions, F(3, 88) = 1.65, p = .184. These results suggest that when 
groups are demonstrating a social trait like kindness, labels are not necessary to encourage 
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selective trust. In contrast, labels encourage children to use past group status to predict later 
group status when the context is epistemic.  
Generalization Trials  
 Figure 1 shows the average number of times out of four trials children endorsed the 
stranger that shared the same shirt color as the previously desirable group as a function of 
condition. Children in the Epistemic Not-Labeled condition responded at chance (M = 2.09, 
SD = 1.23), t(21) = .35, p = .732. Given that these children had earlier not demonstrated 
selective trust for the group preference trials, this result was not surprising. Children in the 
Epistemic Labeled condition, in contrast, did generalize trust to the stranger who was 
explicitly labeled as having been in the desirable group more often than chance, (M = 2.74, 
SD = 1.25), t(23) = 2.83, p = .010, d = 0.59. Surprisingly, children in the Social Labeled (M = 
2.50, SD = 1.38) and Social Not-Labeled (M = 2.52, SD = 1.50) conditions were ambivalent 
between the two strangers, ts < 1.66, ps > .090. These data were particularly surprising for 
the Social-Labeled condition, as children had just selectively trusted the explicitly labeled, 
desirable group but did not trust the stranger who shared that group membership. A one-way 
analysis of variance revealed no significant differences between the Social and Epistemic 
conditions, F(3, 88) = .90, p = .444. These results suggest that children are more willing to 
generalize group traits to strangers only when they are certain about group membership, and 
only when the learning context is an epistemic one.  
Exploratory Questions 
There were three exploratory questions. First, children were asked to identify which 
group had the desirable trait from the familiarization trials. Across all four conditions, 
children had little difficulty. Twenty of the 23 children (87%) in the Epistemic Labeled 
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condition, 19 of the 22 children (86.4%) in the Epistemic Not-Labeled condition, 22 of the 24 
children (91.7%) in the Social Labeled condition, and 20 of the 23 children (87%) in the 
Social Not-Labeled condition responded correctly. These distributions are all greater than 
expected by chance, χ
2
s > 10.21, ps <.001, Yates’ correction applied.  
In the second question, children were asked to choose which shirt color they wanted 
to wear. Overall, 63 of the 92 children (68.5%) chose the color that was associated with the 
desirable trait. Sixteen of the 23 children (69.6%) in the Epistemic Labeled condition, 14 of 
the 22 children (63.6%) in the Epistemic Not-Labeled condition, 17 of the 24 children 
(70.8%) in the Social Labeled condition, and 16 of the 23 children (69.6%) in the Social Not-
Labeled condition responded correctly. The distribution of children in the Social Labeled 
condition was marginally different from chance, χ
2
 = 3.38, p = .066. The distributions from 
the other three conditions were all not greater than expected by chance, χ
2
s < 2.79, ps > .095, 
Yates’ correction applied.   
Finally, children were asked to give a free response about what they thought the 
people in the groups were like. Only 32 of the 92 children (34.8%) provided an accurate trait 
label (e.g., smart, dumb, nice, mean) for one or more of the groups. Given the small sample 
size, analyses broken by both trait type and label status was not meaningful, and the 
following analyses should be interpreted with caution. Collapsing across trait type, of the 32 
children who provided trait labels, 23 of them (71.8%) were in a social condition compared 
to 9 (28.1%) in the epistemic condition; these distributions were significantly different from 
each other, Fisher’s Exact test, p = .005. Collapsing across label status, 21 of the 32 children 
(65.6%) were in a Labeled condition and 11 of them (34.4%) were in a Not-Labeled 
condition; distributions were significantly different, Fisher’s Exact test, p = .051. In other 
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words, some children may have an easier time spontaneously generating their own trait label 
for social than epistemic traits, especially if the groups also had explicit labels (i.e., the “red” 
people vs. “these people”).  
Memory Check 
 At the end of the study, children identified the group that had been knowledgeable or 
nice in the familiarization trials based only on the group members’ faces (they could not see 
the shirt color). Additionally, the memory check was implemented after data collection had 
begun, resulting in 56 of the 92 children being subjected to the memory check. Overall, 42 
out of 56 (75%) children who responded identified the correct group. In the Epistemic 
Labeled condition, 12 of the 16 children (75%) responded correctly on the memory check 
question. Five of the 11 children (45.5%) in the Epistemic Not-Labeled condition, 15 of the 
16 children (93.8%) in the Social Labeled condition, and 10 of the 13 children (76.9%) in the 
Social Not-Labeled condition responded correctly. Children struggled most in remembering 
the faces in the Epistemic Not-Labeled condition, χ
2
 = 0, p = 1. This is interesting, because it 
is also the condition in which children did not generalize traits to strangers. The distributions 
are marginally significant against chance performance in the Epistemic Labeled condition, χ
2
  
= 3.06, , ps =.080, and in the Social Not-Labeled condition, χ
2
 = 2.76, p = .09, Yates’ 
correction applied. The Social Labeled condition was well above chance, χ
2
 = 10.56, p = 
.001, Yates’ correction applied. These results suggest that most children, except those in the 
Epistemic Not-Labeled condition, were paying close enough attention to who was in each 
group that they could correctly identify the groups based on face alone, not shirt color.   
 STRANGERS SHARE KNOWLEDGE WITH GROUPS  31 
 
 
Theory of Mind 
Theory of mind scores range from 0 to 6 with a score of 6 indicating greater 
perspective taking abilities. As expected, the average theory of mind score for children 
overall was 3.62 (SD = 2.06) with older children (M = 4.21, SD = 1.69) having greater theory 
of mind skills compared to younger children (M = 2.98, SD = 2.26), t(79.33) = 2.94, p = .004, 
d = 0.62. A one-way analysis of variance showed that there were no differences in theory of 
mind score across conditions, F(3, 88) = 1.39, p = .250.  
Pearson’s r correlations were conducted to explore whether children’s performance 
on the Theory of Mind task predicted their selective trust in the group preference trials and in 
the generalization trials. No relationship was found between theory of mind and performance 
in the group preferences trials for any condition, rs < .29, ps > .177. There was also no 
relationship in the generalization trials, rs  < .14, ps > .500, in any of the conditions. These 
results suggest that perspective taking ability does not predict children’s likelihood of 
generalizing traits from groups to groups or groups to strangers. 
Discussion 
There were three main results. First, as past research has shown, children readily 
generate a representation of groups as either desirable or not based on just a few examples of 
behavior (e.g., Corriveau et al., 2009; Elashi & Mills, 2014; McDonald et al., 2013). Second, 
whether children extend these group preferences to novel behaviors demonstrated by those 
same groups depends on the social or epistemic context. For the social trait of kindness, 
preschoolers will use those past behaviors to judge which groups’ novel behaviors are the 
kind ones. However, children expect group knowledge to be predictive of future group 
knowledge only if the groups had been explicitly labeled. This result was unexpected, given 
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the plethora of past research that has demonstrated children’s sensitivity to individuals’ 
history of accuracy being a strong cue to future credibility (e.g., Corriveau & Harris, 2009; 
Jaswal & Neely, 2006; Koenig & Harris, 2005). Third, children are only willing to generalize 
group stereotypes to strangers when the strangers are providing information, not when they 
are demonstrating nice or mean behaviors, and only then if the group membership has been 
made explicit.  
In other words, even though children clearly know when groups are being nice or 
mean, and expect those behaviors to be consistent later, they do not expect the same types of 
behavior from strangers who are part of the group. And, even though children clearly know 
when groups are knowledgeable or not, they will only make predictions about that groups’ 
and strangers’ knowledge if the group membership is explicit. Theory of mind ability is not 
related to these judgments. This is the first study to explore how epistemic and social group 
stereotypes might differentially influence preschoolers’ selective preferences. This study 
adds to our understanding of how group behavior might have implications for children’s 
learning and social relationships with novel group members.  
As much previous literature has demonstrated (Jaswal & Neely, 2006, Koenig et al. 
2004, Koenig & Harris, 2005), children in three of the four conditions expected groups to 
behave consistently. But what is interesting is that children seemed to make those 
assumptions using two different decision rules. When learning about novel nice and mean 
behaviors, children relied on the groups’ past behaviors as an indicator of which novel 
behaviors were the kind ones. They did not treat labeled and not labeled groups differently. 
In contrast, in learning about the names of things, children relied on the groups’ given label 
to decide how to categorize novel information. They did not show preferences if they did not 
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know the group label, even though they clearly knew which group had been previously 
accurate. Why the difference? 
Children may be especially cautious about endorsing conventional information, like 
the names for things, from people they know little about because unlearning this type of 
information is cognitively taxing (Jaswal & Kondrad, 2016; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988). 
To avoid learning misinformation, children are “epistemically vigilant” (Sperber et al., 
2010): they carefully evaluate the informant for cues to credibility to determine when to be 
skeptical or deferential of the incoming information. Children be especially cautious about 
trusting a trifecta of previously reliable people about the names for things when it was 
unclear that they were part of a group with a stable “smart” trait. In previous research that 
shows that children do extend past accuracy to future accuracy (Koenig et al., 2004), children 
are normally learning about an individual rather than a group. Children may exercise more 
caution when it comes to making assumptions about what several individuals who happen to 
be sitting near one another and wearing similar shirts will know from one moment to the next 
than they do to one individual. When it is clear that those individuals actually form a group 
(because the group has a label – here, the “red” group, but in real life, perhaps the “black” 
kids or the “girls”), children may begin to treat them as a single unit, much as they would a 
single person. Research on using labels to make category inductions supports this possibility. 
For example, preschoolers are more likely to make category-consistent assumptions about 
individual animals when those animals are labeled (e.g., “it’s a bird”) than if the animals 
were not labeled (Gelman & Coley, 1990).  
 Not only is unlearning effortful, but also if children later used the incorrect word 
with someone else it could cause confusion and, perhaps more importantly, have social 
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consequences. Children consider language expertise to be a powerful marker of in-group and 
out-group status (Corriveau, Kinzler, & Harris, 2013; Kinzler et al., 2009). Children befriend 
people who sound like a native speaker and avoid those who sound foreign (Kinzler & 
DeJesus, 2012). They also endorse information from people who usually know the names for 
familiar objects and avoid those who do not (Jaswal & Neely, 2006; Koenig et al., 2004; 
Koenig & Harris, 2005). Children may realize that when they make mistakes, they may be 
subject to the same treatment: avoided socially and considered “dumb”.  
Children in social situations, regardless of whether groups were explicitly labeled or 
not, expected the nice group to be nice later and the mean group to be mean later. These 
results suggest that children considered the behaviors as indicative of a stable trait. Liu, 
Gelman, and Wellman (2007) conducted a study where 4-and 5-year-old children were asked 
to make predictions about how a peer would behave now and a month later. Some children 
heard the peer described with a trait label (selfish, nice, mean, and shy): “This is Bobby and 
he is mean, Bobby is a very mean boy,” and other children heard the peers’ behavior being 
described: “Mary walks by a boy carrying a plant….Mary pushes the boy and his plant 
falls…”. Liu et al. (2007) found that children made trait-consistent predictions when given 
trait labels but not when they only heard about behaviors. In the current study, children 
presented with social information were asked who was doing the “nice” thing. Children may 
have considered this question as indicative of a trait label, even though they were never 
explicitly told that this was the “nice” group. Because traits are consistent across time, it may 
have been easier for children in the Social context to assume the group behavior would be 
consistent than it was in the knowledge-based groups, in which children were asked who was 
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saying the “right” thing. If we had asked children who was “smart”, which is a trait label, 
they may have responded more like children in the social context. 
Although children in both social situations with and without the category label 
believed the nice group would be nice again, they did not expect strangers to share the same 
behavior patterns. Even when it was explicitly clear that the stranger was part of the same 
group, children were no more likely to think that her novel behaviors were nice as they were 
the other stranger who was clearly in the other, “mean” group. Why would children not 
expect strangers to share the same social traits as their group members? One reason is 
because children had no direct experience with these strangers. They had witnessed for 
themselves several different types of nice behavior in several different contexts from the 
groups. It is possible that children were willing to predict that the groups’ behaviors would be 
stable because they saw that stability earlier for themselves. In fact, that is the very definition 
of a trait – it is a behavior that is consistent across time and context (Conley, 1985). Children 
may be unwilling to apply a trait-label to strangers until they have direct confirmation of the 
behaviors. Additionally, in the social context the group members displayed a variety of nice 
and mean behaviors.  It would be an interesting follow-up study to have a single nice 
behavior being demonstrated several times. For instance, if one were to focus on sharing as a 
nice behavior and have the groups display instances of sharing multiple times; perhaps they 
would be more likely to make inferences about the stranger sharing later when they had seen 
multiple examples of the group members doing that exact behavior. 
This argument may not apply to learning about the names of things. In that case, it 
seems that children do generalize to strangers if group labels (i.e., “red”) are provided. One 
reason is because children may not have considered the knowledge being demonstrated by 
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the group members as a domain-general trait. That is, these groups demonstrated that they 
were knowledgeable about one domain – the names for things. But knowledge or ignorance 
in one domain may not be the same thing as having a consistent trait. Indeed, children in the 
epistemic context provided fewer trait labels in the free response question than those in the 
social context. If the groups had demonstrated being knowledgeable or ignorant across a 
wide variety of domains, much like the nice/mean groups demonstrated several different 
trait-consistent behaviors in a wide variety of contexts, perhaps children would have relied on 
the history of knowledge as a way to make predictions about group knowledge later. As it 
stands, children learning about knowledgeability did not seem to consider the behavior as 
enough evidence to make stable predictions for groups or strangers. They may not have 
considered the group as possessing a trait. As a result, they relied upon the group label when 
it was provided instead of the behaviors.  
 This is not the first time a dual-process model has been proposed to explain the 
puzzling inconsistencies as to when children apply generalizations about certain behaviors 
and when they do not (Hermes, Behne, & Rakoczy, 2018; Sobel & Kushnir, 2013). Hermes 
et al. (2018) argued that unless children have sufficient trait knowledge, they will use a 
global-impression-formation strategy rather than a rational inductive inference strategy. 
Applied to this study, that means that because children in the object learning context perhaps 
did not have sufficient trait knowledge, they generated a global impression of each of the 
groups as “positive and negative” and used this impression as a general heuristic for 
answering the question “who is saying the right thing” all the way through from familiar to 
novel group members. Children may have been able to do this more easily when category 
labels were given in the epistemic context  because they had something concrete (red people) 
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to which they could associate their general impression. In contrast, children who saw social 
information may have used a rational inductive inference strategy, which is considered a type 
II, slow thinking process, because they had sufficient trait knowledge about the groups 
(Hermes et al., 2018). This more systematic thinking may have resulted in children 
recognizing the erroneous thinking associated with generalizing traits to strangers based on 
group membership rather than observation, and thus refraining from stereotyping niceness to 
the strangers.  
In addition to using multiple types of knowledge in order to better establish the 
desirable trait, it would be interesting to see how children make inferences about other traits 
based on the initial trait representation they form about the groups. A consideration with this 
procedure is that, in the epistemic context I used object labeling to establish the “smart or 
dumb” stereotype. Although research in selective trust has shown that children expect 
reliable object labelers to also have other types of knowledge about objects (Koenig & 
Harris, 2005), children recognize that certain types of knowledge do not produce a “halo” 
effect (Koenig & Jaswal, 2011). Future studies could explore whether children will think that 
unfamiliar group members who are stereotyped as “knowledgeable” would also be 
knowledgeable in other domains. It would be interesting to explore whether a positive social 
trait might generalize to positive epistemic expectations about unfamiliar group members (or 
the other way around). 
One of the main findings of this thesis is that in learning situations, group labels 
mattered for children’s expectations about the knowledge of groups and strangers. Previous 
literature suggests that generic language activates stereotypes because it signals normative 
characteristics among members of a category, whereas specific language signals individual, 
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unique characteristics (Cimpian et al., 2010; Cimpian & Markman, 2011; Gelman, Star, & 
Flukes, 2002). For example, when 4-year-olds hear that, “Lorches have purple feathers,” they 
are likely to think that all Lorches share this feature than if they hear that “This Lorch has 
purple feathers,” (Cimpian et al., 2010). Similarly, Gelman et al. (2002) found that 4-year-
olds make more category-based inferences when they hear quantified noun phrases like, “all 
bears like to eat ants” compared to indefinite plural noun phrases, “some bears…”. In the 
epistemic context where labels were used , children learned about the groups using  generic 
language and in that same context without group labels the individuals were referred to using 
specific language. The results support the argument that generic language may increase the 
likelihood that children will use stereotypes to make judgments about novel category 
members. Why this did not seem to matter in the social situation is an open question, but I 
think it is related to the dual-process argument and the trait-state argument described above 
because an aspect needed for Type II processes to engage is sufficient conceptual 
background knowledge of a domain which may have been provided when the child was 
asked who was doing the “nice” thing.  Therefore, in social contexts children’s 
generalizations to the stranger are not as dependent on labeling because they already have 
that sufficient trait knowledge to engage more deliberate thinking and inhibit stereotyping.    
One methodological difference was that in the social situations, the actors wore trait-
consistent facial expressions as cues for niceness and meanness in the familiarization trials, 
whereas actors in the learning situations wore neutral expressions. It is possible that the facial 
expressions may have made it easier for children to associate a trait with the group behavior 
in the social context than in the epistemic one because expression acts as an additional cue to 
niceness and meanness. I think this is unlikely, because children who heard labels in the 
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epistemic context had equally high rates of recognition as children in both, labeled and non-
labeled, social situations for identifying the group with the desirable characteristic at the 
memory check at the end of the study. The high rates of accuracy were impressive, 
considering the difficulty of the memory check. Many factors which would indicate the 
correct group were stripped away in this check (shirt color, side of screen), so children had to 
answer based only on facial recognition. It is interesting that children who did not hear group 
labels in the learning situation showed poor accuracy relative to other groups. This is the 
group of children who struggled to differentiate the groups when labels were not present; – 
perhaps they were using simple heuristics consistent with a global impression formation 
strategy such as relying on shirt color to respond to the questions (Hermes et al., 2018).  
There are a number of additional questions these data raise. For instance, the current 
study explored whether children generate representations of groups and generalize those 
representations to individuals. It would be interesting to explore how children make category 
deductions if the procedure was reversed. Would children build representations about a 
single individual and then apply those attributes to an entire group?  It would also be 
interesting to explore whether using trait labels (“smart” or “nice”) rather than category 
labels (“red” or “blue”) would influence children’s generalizations. Studies suggest that trait 
labels may have a stronger effect on category inductions than category labels (Diesendruck & 
HaLevi, 2006; Heyman & Gelman, 2000).  
The minimal group membership procedure was used in this study specifically so that 
child participants would not identify with either group themselves (Otten, 2016). However, 
shirt color may not be as powerful of a cue to group identity as factors like accent, race or 
gender because it is an arbitrary category, which does not convey any essential traits of the 
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category. This may influence how children make inferences about novel exemplars and thus, 
limit their generalizations. Recall in Bigler’s (1995) study, expression of gender stereotypes 
were greater when teachers identified groups based on gender rather than color. A direction 
for research would be to explore differences in children’s selective preferences of unfamiliar 
individuals when group membership is established using ecological social categories.  
The results presented in this study underscore the importance of better understanding 
how young children come to generate stereotypes about groups and use those stereotypes to 
make inductive inferences about strangers. This is important to understand not only because 
people who may belong to stereotyped groups are affected, but also because using 
stereotypes to guide interactions with people can profoundly impact what children learn 
about, who they learn it from, and who they may want to befriend. Importantly, children 
seem to be more willing in some epistemic contexts to extend trust to strangers based on their 
group membership than they are in social contexts. In social contexts, children seem to avoid 
making generalizations from groups to strangers all together. There may be both positive and 
negative implications of these findings for important social issues, such as the early onset of 
gender or racial prejudice.  
 STRANGERS SHARE KNOWLEDGE WITH GROUPS  41 
 
 
References 
Aboud, E. E. (1988). Children and prejudice. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell. 
Allport, G. (1958). The nature of prejudice. Cambridge: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. 
Ahmadi, S. Z. Z., Jalaie, S., & Ashayeri, H. (2015). Validity and reliability of published 
comprehensive theory of mind tests of normal preschool children: A systematic 
review. Iranian Journal of Psychiatry, 10, 214-224. Retrieved from 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4801491/ 
Baldwin, M. W. (1992). Relational schemas and processing of social information. 
Psychological Bulletin, 112, 461-484. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.112.3.461 
Baltazar, N. C., Shutts, K., & Kinzler, K. D. (2012). Children show heightened memory for 
threatening social actions. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 112, 102-110. 
doi: 10.1016/j.jecp.2011.11.003 
Bar-Tal, D. (1996). Development of social categories and stereotypes in early childhood: The 
case of “The Arab” concept formation, stereotype and attitudes by Jewish children in 
Israel. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 20, 341-370.  
doi: 10.1016/0147-1767(96)00023-5 
Beilock, S. L., Gunderson, E. A., Ramirez, G., & Levine, S. C. (2010). Female teachers’ 
math anxiety affects girls’ math achievement. Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences, 107, 1860-1863. doi: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0910967107 
Belsky, J. (2013). Physical and cognitive development. In C. Woods, & E. Epstein (Eds.), 
Experiencing the Lifespan (p.p. 141-174). New York, NY: Worth.  
 
 STRANGERS SHARE KNOWLEDGE WITH GROUPS  42 
 
 
Bian, L., Leslie, S. J., & Cimpian, A. (2017). Gender stereotypes about intellectual ability 
emerge early and influence children’s interests. Science, 355, 389-391.  
doi: 10.1126/science.aah6524 
Bigler, R. S. (1995). The role of classification skill in moderating environmental influences 
on children’s gender stereotyping: A study of the functional use of gender in the 
classroom. Child Development, 66, 1072-1087. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
8624.1995.tb00923.x 
Bigler, R. S., Jones, L. C., & Lobliner, D. B. (1997). Social categorization and formation of 
intergroup attitudes in children. Child Development, 68, 530-543.  
doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.1997.tb01956.x 
Bigler, R. S., & Liben, L. S. (2006). A developmental intergroup theory of social stereotypes 
and prejudice. Advances in Child Development and Behavior, 34, 39-89.  
doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2407(06)80004-2 
Bigler, R. S., & Liben, L. S. (2007). Developmental intergroup theory: Explaining and 
reducing children’s social stereotyping and prejudice. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 16, 162-166. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
8721.2007.00496.x 
Boseovski, J. J., & Thurman, S. L. (2014). Evaluating and approaching a strange animal: 
Children’s trust in informant testimony. Child Development, 85, 824-834.  
doi: 10.1111/cdev.12156 
Chen, E. E., Corriveau, K. H., & Harris, P. L. (2012). Children trust a consensus composed 
of outgroup members--but do not retain that trust. Child Development, 84, 269-282.  
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2012.01850.x 
 STRANGERS SHARE KNOWLEDGE WITH GROUPS  43 
 
 
Cimpian, A., Brandone, A. C., & Gelman, S. A. (2010). Generic statements require little 
evidence for acceptance but have powerful implications. Cognitive Science, 34, 1452-
1482. doi: 10.1111/j.1551-6709.2010.01126.x 
Cimpian, A., & Markman, E. M. (2009). Information learned from generic language becomes 
central to children’s biological concepts: Evidence from their open-ended 
explanations. Cognition, 113, 14-25. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2009.07.004 
Cimpian, A., & Markman, E. M. (2011). The generic/nongeneric distinction influences how 
children interpret new information about social others. Child Development, 82, 471-
492. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2010.01525.x 
Cimpian, A., & Scott, R. M. (2012). Children expect generic knowledge to be widely shared. 
Cognition, 123, 419-433. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2012.02.003 
Coley, J. D., Medin, D. L., & Atran, S. (1997). Does rank have its privilege? Inductive 
inferences within folkbiological taxonomies. Cognition, 64, 73-112.  
 doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0010-0277(97)00017-6 
Conley, J. J. (1985). Longitudinal stability of personality traits: A multitrait-multimethod-
multioccasion analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 1266-1282. 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.49.5.1266 
Corriveau, K. H., Fusaro, M., & Harris, P. L. (2009). Going with the flow: Preschoolers 
prefer nondissenters as informants. Psychological Science, 20, 372-377.  
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02291.x 
 STRANGERS SHARE KNOWLEDGE WITH GROUPS  44 
 
 
Corriveau, K. H., & Harris, P. L. (2009). Preschoolers continue to trust a more accurate 
informant 1 week after exposure to accuracy information. Developmental Science, 12, 
188-193. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00763.x 
Corriveau, K. H., & Harris, P. L. (2010). Preschoolers (sometimes) defer to the majority in 
making simple perceptual judgements. Developmental Psychology, 46, 437-445.  
doi: 10.1037/a0017553 
Corriveau, K. H., Kinzler, K. D., & Harris, P. L. (2013). Accuracy trumps accent in 
children’s endorsement of object labels. Developmental Psychology, 49, 470-479. 
doi: 10.1037/a0030604 
Corriveau, K. H., Meints, K., & Harris, P. L. (2009). Early tracking of informant accuracy 
and inaccuracy. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 27, 331-342.  
doi: https://doi.org/10.1348/026151008X310229 
Cuevas, K., & Bell, M. A. (2014). Infant attention and early childhood executive function. 
Child Development, 85, 397-404. doi: 10.1111/cdev.12126 
Diesendruck, G., & HaLevi, H. (2006). The role of language, appearance, and culture in 
children’s social category-based induction. Child Development, 77, 539-553.  
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2006.00889.x 
Eagley, A. H., & Steffen, V. J. (1984). Gender stereotypes stem from the distribution of 
women and men into social roles. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46, 
735-754. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.46.4.735 
Elashi, F., & Mills, C. (2014). Trust based on group membership or accuracy? The role of 
group membership on children’s trust decisions. Journal of Experimental Child 
Psychology, 128, 88-104. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2014.07.003 
 STRANGERS SHARE KNOWLEDGE WITH GROUPS  45 
 
 
Galinsky, A. D., & Moskowitz, G. B. (2000). Perspective-taking: Decreasing stereotype 
expression, stereotype accessibility, and in-group favoritism. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 78, 704-728. doi: 10.1037//0022-3514.78.4.708 
Gelman, S. A. (2003) The Essential Child: Origins of Essentialism in Everyday Thought, 
Oxford University Press. 
Gelman, S. A., & Coley, J. D. (1990). The importance of knowing a Dodo is a bird: 
Categories and inferences in 2-year-old children. Developmental Psychology, 26, 
796-804. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.26.5.796 
Gelman, S. A., Star, J. R., & Flukes, J. E. (2002). Children’s use of generics in inductive 
inferences. Journal of Cognition and Development, 3, 179-199.  
doi: 10.1207/S15327647JCD0302_3 
Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995). Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-esteem, 
and stereotypes. Psychological Review, 102, 4-27.  
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.102.1.4 
Hammond, M. D., & Cimpian, A. (2017). Investigating the cognitive structure of stereotypes: 
Generic beliefs about groups predict social judgments better than statistical beliefs. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 146, 607-614.  
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000297 
Haslam, N., Rothschild, L., & Ernst, D. (2000). Essentialist beliefs about social categories. 
British Journal of Social Psychology, 39, 113-127.  
doi: https://doi.org/10.1348/014466600164363 
 
 STRANGERS SHARE KNOWLEDGE WITH GROUPS  46 
 
 
Hermes, J., Behne, T., & Rakoczy, H. (2018). The development of selective trust: Prospects 
for a dual process account. Child Development Perspectives, advance online 
publication. doi: 10.1111/cdep.12274 
Heyman, G., & Gelman, S. A. (2000). Preschool children’s use of novel predicates to make 
inductive inferences. Cognitive Development, 15, 263-280. doi:10.1016/S0885-
2014(00)00028-9 
Hilton, J. L., & Von Hippel, W. (1996). Stereotypes. Annual Review of Psychology, 47, 237-
271. doi: https://doi.org/10.1348/014466600164363 
Hirschfeld, L. A. (1996). Race in the making: Cognition, culture, and the child's construction 
of human kinds. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
Imai, M., Gentner, D., & Uchida, N. (1994). Children's theories of word meaning: The role 
of shape similarity in early acquisition. Cognitive Development, 9, 45-75.  
 doi: 10.1016/0885-2014(94)90019-1 
Jaswal, V. K. (2004). Don’t believe everything you hear: Preschoolers’ sensitivity to speaker 
intent on category induction. Child Development, 75, 1871-1885.  
doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2004.00822.x 
Jaswal, V. K., & Kondrad, R. L. (2016). Why children are not always epistemically vigilant: 
Cognitive limits and social considerations. Child Development Perspectives 0, 1-5. 
doi: 10.1111/cdep.12187 
Jaswal, V. K., McKercher, D. A., & VanderBorght, M. (2008). Limitations on reliability: 
Regularity rules in the English plural and past tense. Child Development, 79, 750-760. 
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2008.01155.x 
 STRANGERS SHARE KNOWLEDGE WITH GROUPS  47 
 
 
Jaswal, V. K., & Neely, L. A. (2006). Adults don’t always know best: Preschoolers use past 
reliability over age when learning new words. Psychological Science, 17, 757-758. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01778.x 
Johnston, A. M., Mills, C. M., & Landrum, A. R. (2015). How do children weigh 
competence and benevolence when deciding whom to trust? Cognition, 144, 76-90. 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.07.015 
Katz, P. A. (1976). The acquisition of racial attitudes in children. In P. A. Katz (Ed.), 
Towards the elimination of racism (pp. 125-154). New York: Pergamon Press. 
Keates, J., & Graham, S. A. (2008). Category markers or attributes: Why do labels guide 
infants’ inductive inferences? Psychological Science, 19, 1287-1293.  
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02237.x  
Kinzler, K. D., Corriveau, K. H., & Harris, P. L. (2011). Children’s selective trust in native-
accented speakers. Developmental Science, 14, 106-111. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
7687.2010.00965.x 
Kinzler, K. D., & DeJesus, J. M. (2012). Children’s sociolinguistic evaluations of nice 
foreigners and mean Americans. Development Psycholog,49, 655-664.  
doi: 10.1037/a0028740 
Kinzler, K. D., Shutts, K., DeJesus, J., & Spelke, E.S. (2009). Accent trumps race in guiding 
children’s social preferences. Social Cognition, 27, 623-634. 
doi:10.1521/soco.2009.27.4.623 
Kinzler, K. D., & Spelke, E. S. (2011). Do infants show social preferences for people 
differing in race? Cognition, 119, 1-9. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2010.10.019 
 STRANGERS SHARE KNOWLEDGE WITH GROUPS  48 
 
 
Koenig, M., Clement, F., Harris, P. L. (2004). Trust in testimony: Children’s use of true and 
false statements. Psychological Science, 15, 694-698. doi: 10.1111/j.0956-
7976.2004.00742.x 
Koenig, M., & Harris, P. L. (2005). Preschoolers mistrust ignorant and inaccurate speakers. 
Child Development, 76, 1261–1277. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
8624.2005.00849.x 
Koenig, M. A., & Jaswal, V. K. (2011). Characterizing children’s expectations about 
expertise and incompetence: Halo or pitchfork effects? Child Development, 82, 1634-
1647. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2011.01618.x 
Landrum, A. R., Pflaum, A. D., & Mills, C. M. (2015). Inducing knowledgeability from 
niceness: Children use social features for making epistemic inferences. Journal of 
Cognition and Development, 17, 699-717.  
doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/15248372.2015.1135799 
Langlois, J. H., Roggman, L. A., Casey, R. J., Ritter, J. M., Rieser-Danner, L. A., & Jenkins, 
V. Y. (1987). Infant preferences for attractive faces: Rudiments of a stereotype? 
Developmental Psychology, 23, 363-369. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0012-
1649.23.3.363 
Liu, D., Gelman, S. A., & Wellman, H. M. (2007). Components of young children’s trait 
understanding: Behavior-to-trait inferences and trait-to-behavior predictions. Child 
Development, 78, 1543-1558. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01082.x 
Mahajan, N., & Wynn, K. (2012). Origins of “us” versus “them”: Prelinguistic infants prefer 
similar others. Cognition, 124, 227-233.  
doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2012.05.003 
 STRANGERS SHARE KNOWLEDGE WITH GROUPS  49 
 
 
Mahy, C. E., Moses, L. J., & Pfeifer, J. H. (2014). How and where: Theory-of-mind in the 
brain. Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, 9, 68-81.  
doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dcn.2014.01.002 
Mareschal, D., & Quinn, P. C. (2001). Categorization in Infancy. TRENDS in Cognitive 
Sciences, 5, 443-450. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01752-6 
McDonald, K., Schug, M., Chase, E., & Barth, H. (2013). My people, right or wrong? 
Minimal group membership disrupts preschoolers’ selective trust. Cognitive 
Development, 28, 247- 259. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2016.03.011 
McGarty, C., Yzerbyt, V. Y., & Spears, R. (2002). Social, cultural and cognitive factors in 
stereotype formation. In C. McGarty, V. Yzerbyt, & R. Spears (Eds.). Stereotypes as 
Explanations: The formation of meaningful beliefs about social groups( pp. 1-15). 
UK: Cambridge University Press.  
Medin, D. L., & Ortony, A. (1989). Psychological essentialism. In S. Vosniadou & A. Ortony 
(Eds.), Similarity and analogical reasoning. UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Medin, D. L., & Smith, E. E. (1981). Strategies and classification learning. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 7, 241-253.  
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.7.4.241 
Meiser, T., & Hewstone, M. (2004). Cognitive processes in stereotype formation: The role of 
correct contingency learning for biased group judgements. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 87, 599-614. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.87.5.599 
Mulvey, K. L., Rizzo, M. T., & Killen, M. (2016). Challenging gender stereotypes: Theory of 
mind and peer group dynamics. Developmental Science, 19, 999-1010. 
doi:10.1111/desc.12345 
 STRANGERS SHARE KNOWLEDGE WITH GROUPS  50 
 
 
Otten, S. (2016). The minimal group paradigm and its maximal impact in research on social 
categorization. Current Opinion in Psychology, 11, 85-89.  
doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2016.06.010 
Palmquist, C. M., Jaswal, V. K., Rutherford, A. (2016). Success inhibits preschoolers’ ability 
to establish selective trust. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 152, 192-204.      
doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2016.07.015 
Piaget, J. (1970). Piaget’s theory. In H. Mussen (Ed.), Carmichael’s manual of child 
psychology (3rd ed., pp. 703-710). New York: Wiley. 
Rhodes, M. (2012). Naïve theories of social groups. Child Development, 00, 1-17.  
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2012.01835.x 
Rhodes, M. (2013). How two intuitive theories shape the development of social 
categorization. Child Development Perspectives, 7, 12-16. doi: 10.1111/cdep.12007 
Rhodes, M., & Gelman, S. A. (2009). A developmental examination of conceptual structure 
of animal, artifact, and human social categories across two cultural contexts. 
Cognitive Psychology, 59, 244-274. doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2009.05.001 
Rhodes, M., Leslie, S., & Tworek, C. M. (2012). Cultural transmission of social essentialism. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109, 13526-13531.  
doi: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1208951109 
Rothbart, M., & Taylor, M. (1992). Category labels and social reality: Do we view social 
categories as natural kinds? In G. R. Semin & K. Fiedler (Eds.), Language, 
interaction and social cognition (pp. 11-36). London: Sage. 
Sabbagh, M. A., Xu, F., Carlson, S. M., Moses, L. J., Lee, K. (2006). The development of 
executive functioning and theory of mind. Psychological Science, 17, 74-81.  
 STRANGERS SHARE KNOWLEDGE WITH GROUPS  51 
 
 
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2005.01667.x 
Shutts, K., Kinzler, K. D., McKee, C. B., Spelke, E. S. (2009). Social information guides 
infants’ selection of foods. Journal of Cognitive Development, 10, 1-17. 
doi:10.1080/15248370902966636 
Sobel, D. M., & Kushnir, T. (2013). Knowledge matters: How children evaluate the 
reliability of testimony as process of rational inference. Psychological Review, 4, 779-
797. doi: 10.1037/a0034191 
Sperber, D., Clement, F., Heintz, C., Mascaro, O., Mercier, H., Origgi, G., & Wilson, D. 
(2010). Epistemic Vigilance. Mind and Language, 25, 359-393.  
 doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01394.x 
Tajfel, H. (1969). Cognitive aspects of prejudice. Journal of Social Issues, 25, 79-97.  
Tenney, E. R., Small, J. E., Kondrad, R. L., Jaswal, V. K., & Spellman, B. A. (2011). 
Accuracy, confidence, and calibration: How young children and adults assess 
credibility. Developmental Psychology, 47, 1065. doi: 10.1037/a0023273 
VanderBorght, M., & Jaswal, V. K. (2009). Who knows best? Preschoolers sometimes prefer 
child informants over adult informants. Infant Child Development, 1, 61-71. 
doi:10.1002/icd.591 
Wellman, H. M., Fang, F., Liu, D., Zhu, L., & Liu, G. (2006) Scaling of theory-of-mind 
understanding in Chinese children. Psychological Science, 17, 1075-1081.  
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01830.x 
Wellman, H. M., & Liu, D. (2004). Scaling of theory-of-mind tasks. Child Development, 75, 
523-541. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2004.00691.x 
 STRANGERS SHARE KNOWLEDGE WITH GROUPS  52 
 
 
Wilkes, A. L., & Leatherbarrow, M. (1988). Editing episodic memory following the 
identification of error. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 40, 361-
387. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/02724988843000168 
Zelazo, P. D., Carlson, S. M., & Kezek, A. (2008). The development of executive function in 
childhood. In C. Nelson, & M. Luciana (Eds.), Handbook of Developmental 
Cognitive Neuroscience (2 ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
  
 STRANGERS SHARE KNOWLEDGE WITH GROUPS  53 
 
 
Tables 
 
Table 1.  
Stimuli and Labels for the Epistemic Condition 
Object Used       Label Used 
Familiarity trials 
 Ball versus shoe    “Which is the shoe?” 
 Cup versus dog    “Which is the cup?” 
 hat versus book    “Which is the book?” 
 Spoon versus bottle    “Which is the spoon?”  
Group preference trials 
 Rubber squeegee versus deer warner  “Which is the toma?” 
 Hose nozzle versus toilet flapper  “Which is the modi?” 
 Strainer versus cocktail pourer  “Which is the dawnoo?” 
 Shin pad versus door hook   “Which is the dax?”  
Generalization trials  
Paint roller versus potato masher  “Which is the fliff?” 
Grey funnel versus oil filter   “Which is the feppin?” 
Garlic press versus hose attachment  “Which is the riff?” 
Siphon versus lemon juicer   “Which is the terval?” 
Catch trials 
 Banana versus orange    “Which is the orange?” 
Elephant versus horse    “Which is the horse?”  
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Table 2.  
Behaviors Used in the Social Condition 
Nice Behavior /Verbs    Mean Behavior/Verbs 
Familiarity trials 
 Giving cookies    Stealing cookies 
 Helping someone    Pushing someone 
 Saying nice things    Saying mean things 
 Sharing toys     Breaking toys 
Group Preference trials 
 Rosted the spoon    Mizzed the spoon 
 Daxed the hat     Larped the hat 
 Tooded the shoe    Blicked the shoe 
 Gabbered the cup    Fliffed the cup 
Generalization trials  
Zaved the book    Clided the book 
 Froomed the ball    Vogged the ball 
 Jiped the bottle    Cotted the bottle 
 Pogged the dog    Rixxed the dog 
Catch trials 
 Taping someone’s paper   Tearing someone’s paper  
Hugging someone    Hitting someone   
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Familiarization 
Trials 
Group Preference 
Trials 
Generalization 
Trials 
Condition n M SD M SD M SD 
Epistemic  
Labeled  
23 3.87* 0.46 2.91* 1.08   2.74* 1.25 
Epistemic  
Not-Labeled 
22 3.59* 0.66      2.45 1.10 2.09 1.23 
Social  
Labeled 
24 4.00* 0.00 3.13* 1.33 2.50 1.38 
Social  
Not-Labeled 
23 3.91* 0.28 3.17* 1.30 2.52 1.50 
Note. * indicates means that are significantly different from chance at a p value of .05 
 
Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations by Trait and Identification Condition 
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Figure 1. Means of performance in each trial block by trait and identification condition 
* indicates conditions that are significantly different from chance at a .05 p value. 
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Appendix A 
Wellman and Liu (2004) Theory of Mind Tasks 
1.    Diverse Desires: Children see a toy figure of an adult and a sheet of paper with a carrot 
and a cookie drawn on it. “Here’s Mr. Jones. It’s snack time, so, Mr. Jones wants a snack to 
eat. Here are two different snacks: a carrot and a cookie. Which snack would you like best? 
Would you like a carrot or a cookie best?” Point to each of the images as you say the names. 
This is the own desire question.  
If the child chooses the carrot: “Well, that’s a good choice, but Mr. Jones really likes cookies. 
He doesn’t like carrots. What he likes best are cookies.” (Or, if the child chooses the cookie, 
he or she is told Mr. Jones likes carrots.) Then the child is asked the target question: “So now 
it’s time to eat. Mr. Jones can only choose one snack, just one. Which snack will Mr. Jones 
choose? A carrot or a cookie?”  
Correct: Child must answer the target question opposite from his or her answer to the own 
desire question.  
2.    Diverse Beliefs: Children see a toy figure of a girl and a sheet of paper with bushes and 
a garage drawn on it. “Here’s Linda. Linda wants to find her cat. Her cat might be hiding in 
the bushes or it might be hiding in the garage [point to each image as you say the names]. 
Where do you think the cat is? In the bushes or in the garage?” Point to each of the images as 
you say the names. This is the own belief question.  
If the child chooses the bushes: “Well, that’s a good idea, but Linda thinks her cat is in the 
garage. She thinks her cat is in the garage.” (Or, if the child chooses the garage, he or she is 
told Linda thinks her cat is in the bushes.) Then the child is asked the target question: “So 
where will Linda look for her cat? In the bushes or in the garage?”  
Correct: Child must answer the target question opposite from his or her answer to the own 
belief question.  
3.    Knowledge Access: Children see a nondescript box containing a small object inside. 
“Here’s a box. What do you think is inside this box?” (The child can give any answer he or 
she likes or indicate that he or she does not know). Next, the box is opened and the child is 
shown the contents of the box: “Let’s see…it’s really an X inside!” Close the box: “OK, 
what is the box?”  
Then a toy figure of a girl is produced: “Polly has never ever seen inside this box. Now here 
comes Polly. So, does Polly know what is in the box? (the target question) “Did Polly see 
inside this box?” (the memory question).  
Correct: Child must answer the target question “no” and answer the memory question “no”. 
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 4.    Contents False Belief: The child sees a clearly identifiable band-aid box with a plastic 
toy animal inside the closed box. “Here’s a band-aid box. What do you think is inside the 
band-aid box? Next, the band-aid box is opened: “Let’s see…it’s really an X inside!” This 
band-aid box is closed: “OK, what is inside the band-aid box?”  
Then a toy figure of a boy is produced: “Peter has never ever seen inside this band-aid box. 
Now here comes Peter. So what does Peter think is in the box? Band-aids or an X? (the 
target question) “Did Peter see inside the box? (the memory question).  
Correct: Child must answer the target question “band-aids” and the memory question “no”. 
 5.    Explicit False Belief: Children see a toy figure of a boy and a sheet of paper with a 
backpack and a closet drawn on it. “Here’s Scott. Scott wants to find his mittens. His mittens 
might be in his backpack or they might be in the closet. Really, Scott’s mittens are in his 
backpack. But Scott thinks his mittens are in the closet.”  
“So, where will Scott look for his mittens? In his backpack or in the closet?” Point to each of 
the images as you say the names. (the target question). “Where are Scott’s mittens really? In 
his backpack or in the closet?” Point to each of the images as you say the names. (the reality 
question).  
Correct: Child must answer the target question “closet” and the reality question “backpack”.  
6.    Real-Apparent Emotion: Initially, children see a sheet of paper with three faces drawn 
on it – a happy, a neutral, and a sad face – to check that the child knows these emotional 
expressions. Then that paper is put aside, and the task begins with the child being shown a 
picture of a boy drawn from the back to that the boy’s facial expression cannot be seen. “This 
story is about a boy. I’m going to ask you about how the boy really feels inside [touch your 
chest] and how he looks on his face [touch your face].”  
“This story is about Matt. Matt’s friends were playing together and telling jokes. One of the 
older children, Rosie, told a mean joke about Matt and everyone laughed. Everyone thought 
it was very funny, but not Matt. But Matt did want the other children to see how he felt about 
the joke, because they would call him names. So, Matt tried to hide how he felt.” Then the 
child gets two memory checks: “What did the other children do when Rosie told a mean joke 
about Matt?” (laughed/thought it was funny). “In the story, what would the other children do 
if they knew how Matt felt?” (call him names/tease him).  
Pointing to the emotion pictures: “So how did Matt really feel when everyone laughed? Did 
he feel happy, sad, or OK?” (the target-feel question) “How did Matt try to look on his face, 
when everyone laughed? Did he look happy, sad, or OK?” (the target-look question).  
Correct: Child’s answer to the target-feel question must be more negative than his or her 
answer to the target-look question 
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